We study the e¤ect of competition on quality in markets such as health care, long-term care and education, when providers choose both prices and quality in a setting of spatial competition. We o¤er a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and riskaverse. Our proposed mechanism can help explain several empirical …ndings of a negative e¤ect of competition on quality.
Introduction
Quality is a key concern for consumers in many sectors such as health, long-term care and education. Hospitals, nursing homes, schools and universities compete on quality to attract patients, residents and students. While in some countries prices are typically regulated and …xed, in other countries they are not. In this study we focus on institutional settings where providers compete both on quality and price. For example, prices are variable in the hospital sector in the US for patients who are not part of public programmes such as Medicare (for the elderly) or Medicaid (for the poor). In England, the government recently discussed whether public insurers should be able to negotiate prices with public hospitals, so that they would compete not only on quality but also on price. It was ultimately decided not to allow competition on prices due to concerns that quality may su¤er (a …xed price regulation regime has therefore been maintained; Kmietowicz, 2011) . In the UK, France and the US, long-term care institutions (e.g., nursing homes, residential homes) compete on prices to attract residents in addition to quality. Universities in the US, and from 2012 in the UK, compete on prices in addition to quality. In the UK nurseries o¤er di¤erent services in combination with di¤erent prices for child care, and therefore also compete on price and quality.
In this study we investigate whether competition among providers can lead to a reduction in quality when providers compete on both quality and price. We do so in a spatial Hotelling-type model, which is a standard framework for studying quality competition in sectors like health care or education. We show that competition can reduce quality in addition to prices when two assumptions hold: i) the provider is motivated and has a genuine concern for quality; ii) the marginal utility from pro…ts is decreasing. We think that both assumptions are likely to hold in the type of sectors we have in mind. The …rst assumption has been well recognised in the health economics and motivated agents literature. The second assumption is also reasonable for providers with concentrated ownership, for liquidity-constrained providers, and for …rms and organisations where control has been delegated to risk-averse managers. 1 In our Hotelling spatial set-up we model competition as the equivalent of lower transportation costs. The existing literature already points out two counteracting e¤ects generated by compe- 1 See Section 2 for references and further discussion of both of these assumptions.
tition. While more competition increases the incentives to supply high quality for given prices, more competition also reduces the price-cost margin, which, in turn, reduces the incentives to invest in quality. Ma and Burgess (1993) report that the direct e¤ect of more competition on quality is exactly o¤set by the indirect e¤ect via lower prices so that overall there is no e¤ect of more competition on quality. The same result is reported by Gravelle (1999) . Thus, the existing spatial economics literature o¤ers little insight about the determinants of the relative strength of the two above-mentioned e¤ects. In particular, no speci…c mechanisms have been proposed that could produce a negative relationship between competition and quality. 2;3 We show that under the two above-mentioned assumptions, a third e¤ect emerges and competition actually reduces quality. The intuition is that more competition leads to lower prices, which in turn reduces pro…ts and increases the marginal utility from pro…ts. Being motivated, the providers work at a negative pro…t margin and will therefore respond optimally to …ercer competition by reducing quality in order to recover some of the pro…t losses generated by the price reduction.
Our proposed mechanism might rationalise some of the empirical evidence which …nds a negative relationship between quality and competition. between competition and quality (a positive relation between competition and mortality rates for patients with heart attack) when …xed-price regulation was not yet introduced and prices were allowed to vary. Grabowski (2004) …nds that competition reduces the quality of nursing homes in the US. 4 
Model and analysis
Consider a market with two providers located at each endpoint of the line segment S = [0; 1].
Consumers are uniformly located on S with a total mass of one, and each consumer demands 2 Using a Salop model, Economides (1993) …nds that a higher number of …rms leads to lower equilibrium quality, but this is purely due to a demand e¤ect and not related to competition per se. 3 In a very di¤erent theoretical framework, with monopolistic competition, imperfect information and consumer search, Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) show that improved price information might reduce quality provision, possibly to the extent that welfare is reduced. 4 See also Gaynor (2006) for survey on the e¤ects of competion on quality in health care markets.
one unit from the most preferred provider. The utility of a consumer located at x 2 S and buying from provider i is given by
where v is gross consumer surplus, q i is the quality of provider i, p i is the price charged by provider i and t is a transportation cost parameter measuring the importance of travelling distance relative to quality di¤erences.
Each consumer makes a utility-maximising choice of provider, which gives the demand for provider 1 as
while demand for provider 2 is D 2 = 1 D 1 . Lower travelling costs make demand for each provider more price-and quality-elastic. Thus, following the standard practice in the literature, we will measure the degree of competition in the market by t 1 .
Pro…ts for provider i is given by
where c is the marginal cost of providing the good and g (q i ) is the …xed cost of quality with
The objective function of provider i is given by
We make two critical assumptions. First, we assume that providers are motivated and have a concern about quality: U q i > 0 and U q i q i 0. This could be due to altruism or motivation. This assumption is likely to hold in the health, long-term care and education sectors, as well as other public sector industries. In the health economics literature, it has long been recognised that providers (doctors, nurses, health care managers) are, at least to some extent, altruistic. assumption is also made in the recent literature on motivated agents in the broader public sector, where the agent is assumed to share, to some extent, the objective function of the principal. 6 The main idea is that organisations that provide public (or publicly-provided private) goods have a mission, and individuals who work in such organisations are 'mission-oriented'or 'motivated'.
Examples given in this literature include doctors and nurses who are committed to improve health, teachers who care about good learning, and researchers who are committed to expanding knowledge.
Second, we also allow for risk-averse providers by assuming that U i is more costly than internal …nancing, the …rm's marginal value of pro…ts will decrease with the pro…t level. Thus, the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of pro…ts might be particularly relevant for organisations that have small pro…t margins or that are close to breaking even. 7 In the context of health care markets, which is one of the main applications of the present note, the assumption of risk-averse hospitals have been used by, e.g., Hodgkin and McGuire (1994),
Mougeot and Naegelen (2008) and Felder (2009).
To keep the analysis simple we assume that U i i q i = 0 since this is not critical for our main result. We assume that the two providers choose price and quality simultaneously. The …rst-order conditions for the optimal quality and price for provider i are, respectively,
and
The symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted by q and p , has quality and price given by 8
From the optimality condition on price we obtain:
Thus, more competition, in the form of lower transportation costs, reduces the price. Substituting p = c + t into the condition for optimal quality yields
What is the e¤ect of more competition on quality? Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to t, and keeping in mind that equilibrium pro…t is = t 2 g (q ), we derive
where the denominator is positive by the second-order condition. From (10), notice that 1 2 g q = Uq U < 0. Therefore, more competition reduces quality. The intuition for our key result is the following. More competition generates three e¤ects. First, it makes the demand more responsive to a marginal increase in quality. For a given mark-up (p c = t > 0), this e¤ect tends to increase quality. However, more competition also reduces the mark-up, which reduces the marginal pro…t from an increase in quality. These two e¤ects o¤set each other completely.
Under our two critical assumptions, there is however a third e¤ect. More competition reduces the price, which in turn reduces pro…ts and increases the marginal utility from pro…ts. Since providers are motivated, the marginal pro…t of quality is negative in equilibrium ( 1 2 g q < 0). 8 The second-order conditions are:
Therefore, each provider responds optimally to more competition by reducing quality in order to recover some of the pro…t losses generated by the price reduction.
Notice the criticality of our two key assumptions. If marginal utility does not decrease with higher pro…ts, then U = 0 and @q =@t = 0. If the marginal utility is constant, variations in pro…ts do not a¤ect the relative willingness to provide quality. If the provider is not motivated, then U q = 0, 1 2 g q = 0 and @q =@t = 0. In this case, quality is set to maximise pro…ts so that, by the Envelope Theorem, a marginal reduction in quality has no e¤ect on pro…ts.
Conclusions
The relationship between competition and quality in sectors like health care, elderly care and education, is a hotly debated policy issue in several countries. While several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between competition and quality in these sectors, the existing theoretical literature is lacking in terms of o¤ering precise mechanisms that can explain these …ndings. In this note we have o¤ered one such possible (and novel) mechanism and shown that this mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and risk-averse. For given quality levels, …ercer competition results in lower pro…ts due to lower prices. We have shown that providers with the two above-mentioned characteristics will respond by lowering their quality in order to recover some of these pro…t losses.
